Abstract
Introduction
In IP multicast data transmission [1] , a source sends a packet only once. It is then replicated on its way to all recipients. Thus, multicast networking saves source bandwidth, reduces latency observed by receivers, and yields lower costs to network providers. However, security is a significant concern when revenue is to be generated from multicast services. A multicast network is inherently more susceptible to attacks because it presents more opportunities for interception of its network traffic, as the data are now open to a much wider population. In IP multicast networks as specified in RFC 1112, there is no mechanism for restricting non-group members from accessing the group communication. This basic drawback of multicast makes it impossible to prevent unauthorized access to the service resources. In addition, the recipients are (in general) unknown to the sender, making it difficult to charge them for the services. Finally, since multicast addresses are generally well advertised and made public, it becomes easier for an attacker to launch an attack. If the attack is successful, a potentially large number of principals is affected. To resolve these issues, e-commerce protocols must meet specific requirements, such as authentication of data and principal parties, data confidentiality, and money atomicity. Liability will also become a significant issue because the subscriber has to share his sensitive credentials such as credit card information with unknown principals, while merchants have to make sure that they are dealing with an authenticated customer. Therefore, providing an e-commerce infrastructure for multicast services requires availability of e-commerce protocols that could secure e-commerce transactions.
Problem statement
If the multicast service is offered on the basis of pay-per-view, accounting for the resource usage becomes very important as subscribers are to be charged in a fair manner for their consumed resources. Principal parties would have many questions for which they seek an answer. For example, the concerned principal could have the following questions:
• Who will conduct the authentication process?
• How to verify the identity of the hosts and subscribers, and legitimacy of merchants? • What kinds of information must be verified?
• What authority and access privileges should be enforced? • What is the liability and risk involved in the transaction processes?
• Are the subscriber's e-payment credentials secured? For example, an e-payment system should reliably carry out e-commerce transactions between a merchant and its subscriber. Thus, securing e-commerce transactions for multicast services implies that there should be mechanisms for authenticating an end-host and its subscriber, authorization of subscriber and his payments, encryption of data for confidentiality protection, secure key distribution to the multicast groups and its hosts, and accounting for e-commerce sessions. If vulnerabilities in any of these protocol components persist, the security of the applied infrastructure could be compromised.
Prior related work
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [2] is being developed jointly by IETF and IRTF working groups. The HIP architecture introduces a new namespace, the Host Identity namespace, between the network layer and the transport layer. This namespace introduces new Host Identifiers (HIs), which are cryptographic public keys. HIP decouples a transport UDP association from its network IP address and couples it to an HI, thus separating the host identity role (the HI) from the host locating role (the IP address). A hash of HI, namely Host Identity Tag (HIT) of 128-bit length is generated for representing the host identity in IPv6 sized address structures. Similarly, a 32-bit length Local Scope Identifier (LSI) is used in IPv4 sized address structures.
The AAA working group of IETF [3] has presented a general AAA framework for securing an interdomain infrastructure. The most important components of the AAA framework are AAA server, Network Access Server (NAS), and AAA protocols. The AAA server provides distributed authentication, authorization and accounting services to subscriber's sessions. It has distributed AAA clients across networks, namely NAS [4] , for providing the functionality of AAA services. The AAA services are shared securely with NAS through AAA protocols such as Diameter [5] , RADIUS [6] , and TACACS [7] .
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) [8] is the simplest e-payment protocol that provides secure end-to-end communication over insecure channels above TCP/IP. It supports authentication of the content provider, data encryption and message integrity. In SSL/TLS, only merchants are required to possess public-key certificates while subscribers could be anonymous. Since SSL/TLS protects data only while it is being transmitted, the content provider has access to the subscriber's sensitive information such as the credit card details.
The authors in [8] have performed an inductive analysis of TLS, using the theorem prover Isabelle to prove TLS security goals.
The Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) specification [9] is an open technical standard for the commerce industry developed by Netscape, Visa, MasterCard and other partners as a way to facilitate secure e-payment transactions over the Internet. SET overcomes the drawbacks of SSL, as it offers protection of all the transaction data. SET offers nonrepudiation of all the principal parties involved in an ecommerce transaction. However, the SET payment process is slightly more complicated than the other epayment protocols because it requires distributing keys among all principal parties and verifying certificates during each transaction.
The iKP protocols were first developed in 1995 by a group of researchers at the IBM research labs [10] . It is a multi-party secure scheme where no party is forced to trust other parties with no reason. iKP protocols are based on public-key cryptography. The protocols are named 1KP, 2KP, and 3KP depending on the number of public key-pairs used in each payment system involving the merchant, subscriber and Payment Gateway (PG) that processes e-payment details of the subscriber. In the 1KP protocol, the PG alone possesses a public key while subscribers and merchants only need to have authentic copies of PG's public key, reflected in a public key certificate. This protocol does not provide non-repudiation for the messages exchanged between subscriber and merchant. In the 2KP protocol, both the merchant and the PG possess public key-pairs, where e-payments are authorized only after verifying the credit card number (CC#). In the 3KP protocol, all the three players possess public keypairs, where e-payments are authorized only after validating both the CC# and the digital signature of the subscriber.
However, we did not find any literature on how to secure e-commerce transactions for multicast services.
Research scope
The objectives of our research work can be put forth as follows:
• Elaborate an architecture for e-payments applicability to multicast services that is scalable, flexible and secure; • Assess the architecture.
To address these objectives, we have made the following contributions:
• A scalable, flexible and secure architectural framework that offers authentication of host and its user, authorization of subscriber and his e-payments, accounting for each e-commerce transaction, and non-repudiation of principal parties in e-commerce; • Formal validation of the proposed protocol suite using the AVISPA tool.
Structure of the paper
Section 2 presents the proposed Secure E-commerce Transactions for Multicast Services (SETMS) architectural design framework. It describes the assumptions, system components and operational infrastructure of SETMS framework that are required to secure e-commerce operational environment for multicast services. Section 3 presents a formal validation of the SETMS protocol suite using the AVISPA tool. Section 4 discusses the conclusion of this research, stating the advantages and limitations of the SETMS framework.
Proposed SETMS framework
We present our proposed Secure E-Commerce Transactions for Multicast Services (SETMS) framework, which secures the e-commerce sessions for multicast services. The framework provides the following features: 1) Dynamic subscription of the host to multicast services, 2) Reliable authentication of all principals that are involved in an e-commerce transaction, 3) Secure e-payments and user identity, 4) Management of e-payments, 5) Authorization based on service policies, 6) Accounting for the subscriber's consumed resources, 7) Non-repudiation of principals involved in an e-transaction, 8) Opportunity for new merchants to participate in e-commerce, and 9) Widescale interoperability, adaptability, acceptability and scalability of the distributed multicast services.
SETMS assumptions
The SETMS framework assumes the availability of standard cryptographic algorithms and protocols, but it does not stipulate the use of any specific algorithm or protocol. We assume that the host identity details of the subscriber that are available to content providers are not a possible source of threats to e-commerce transactions. The framework is assumed not to make any discretionary assumptions concerning the services offered by the network or the communication protocol, i.e., it should be possible to implement this framework on any network that supports "best-effort" multicast services.
SETMS system components
The SETMS framework is made up of the following components: 1) Subscriber, 2) AAA server, 3) Merchant's content provider, 4) Policy server, 5) Payment gateway, and 6) E-commerce trust model components. The architecture of the SETMS framework is shown in Figure 1 .
Error! Figure 1 . SETMS architectural design 1) Subscriber: A subscriber is an end user who has requested a multicast service after agreeing with the service terms put forth by the merchant. The subscriber is required to possess a credit card to gain access to ecommerce services. However, e-Cash based [11] , eCheque based [11, 12] , Micropayments based or Smartcard based [13] e-payment platforms could also be used for e-payments. A credit card can be obtained from an 'Issuer', which is typically an authorized financial institution that issues credit cards to its customers.
2) AAA server: The AAA server is a server that provides distributed authentication, authorization and accounting services to end-host's sessions. It also maintains a database for storing the details of legitimate subscribers. It has distributed AAA clients namely, NAS for providing the functionality of AAA services. The interface between the AAA server and the NAS is secured through AAA protocols such as Diameter [5] , RADIUS [6] , or TACACS [7] . More on AAA protocols, their attribute-value representation of AAA data and their bit lengths can be found in [14] .
3) Merchant's content provider: Merchant's Content Provider (MCP) is a server that provides services of a merchant to its subscribers. It validates the authorization requests of its subscribers. In most occasions, it may store subscriber's identification details to track the usage pattern of its services. It defines the service policies for each of its multicast applications. These policies dictate the access control privileges of its subscribers.
4) Policy server:
The Policy Server (PS) is a server that stores the service parameters of each merchant. It accepts the attribute-value pairs sent by the MCP, denoting the multicast service parameters of its merchants. It provides for systematic representation of merchant's service parameters, which could be readily accepted by the AAA server. The PS decentralizes the content provider's authorization procedure enabling multicast services scalability under heavy loads. It also acts as a mutual authenticator between the AAA server and the MCP, thus eliminating the probability of fake merchants posing as genuine merchants.
5) Payment gateway:
The Payment Gateway (PG) is a gateway that resides between MCP and the acquiring bank of the merchant, namely Acquirer. It has access to the issuer and the acquirer via secured payment networks, which is the hub for financial institutions. In e-commerce, it is used for authenticating the merchants, and validating the financial credentials of subscribers.
6) PKI trust model components:
In e-commerce, a merchant and his subscriber are unlikely to trust each other. The subscriber would be reluctant to give access to his e-payment details to his merchant, and similarly the merchant does not want to provide his service to unauthorized subscribers. This problem has motivated us to build a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [15] based on trust components generally referred as on-line trusted third party (TTP) components. PKI provides ecommerce security through the use of digital certificates and public key cryptography. PKI supports security features such as privacy, data integrity, access control, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. The trust components of PKI include Certification Authority (CA) [16, 17] , Registration Authority (RA), Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [18] , Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), and Certificate Policy (CP) and Certificate Practice Statement (CPS).
SETMS system operational infrastructure
It is impossible to deploy multicast services in an ecommerce environment unless proper authentication, access control and accounting mechanisms are enforced for multicast services. If any flaw persists in these mechanisms, this could lead to privacy theft, confidentiality violation, network congestion, no flow control and financial property losses. Overall, the scalability and reliability of the multicast services will be limited. Therefore, we describe the SETMS operational infrastructure, which supports authentication, access control, accounting, e-payments, message integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation.
Authentication processes.
For the SETMS framework, we describe the identity authentication as follows. Identity authentication is a protocol whereby some principals can prove their identities to each other. It ensures that no principal can impersonate another principal. Identity authentication can be further classified into host and user authentication. Host authentication is required to allow only the identified hosts to have access to the multicast traffic, while user authentication is required to determine if a principal has the privilege to participate in an e-commerce transaction. In the SETMS framework, there are specific principals involved in each authentication process. There should be some authentication process in each of the following pairs represented simply as (subscriber, AAA server), (subscriber, MCP), (MCP, PS), and (PS, AAA server).
The authentication process in (subscriber, AAA server) could be supported by the HIP [2] . HIP provides a 4-way handshake between the NAS and end-host to set up a HIP Security Association (SA), which involves exchange of Diffie-Hellman keys [19] . The key exchange process involves mutual authentication of the AAA server and end-host. The communication link could be protected by IPSec ESP for sending the key details of the data decryption as specified in [20] . The subscriber is automatically authenticated in the process of the payment authorization. Since the authorization details contain the user identity details such as the subscriber's name, address, and credit card details, MCP can authenticate the user once the payment authorization is validated.
Access control processes.
In the SETMS framework, we use processes in two steps. In first step, we describe the processes involved in authorizing the e-payment details of subscribers (and authentication of host). In second step, we discuss processes involving the description, formatting and sharing of the service parameters between the MCP, PS and AAA server.
1) E-payment authorization processes:
We define the triple (subscriber, MCP, PG) to describe the epayment authorization processes for securing ecommerce payment transactions. We have relied on the concepts of 2KP e-payment protocol [10] for validating the subscriber's e-payments. Specifically, SETMS employs the concepts of a variant of the 2KP protocol for enforcing the e-payment authorization processes. The 2KP requires the merchant to possess a digital signature in addition to the digital signature of the PG.
At first, the subscriber visits the merchant's website and inspects the terms and conditions of service such as price for service duration, accepted payment types, and support for macro/micro payment. Once the Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology and the 3rd IEEE International Conference on Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce, and E-Services (CEC/EEE'06) subscriber agrees to the service terms and conditions, the host's software initiates the e-payment process by sending a service request to the merchant. The epayment authorization process is depicted in Figure 2 . Error!
Figure 2. E-payment authorization in SETMS
Where, Id S is the identification details of the subscriber containing CC#. DESC is the description of multicast service. SALT S is a random number generated by the subscriber, which offers protection against dictionary attacks. N S is a nonce generated by the subscriber, which offers protection against replay attacks. Sig MCP is the signature of MCP. E PG is the encryption of the payment details using the PG's public key. SLIP is the concatenation of payment parameters such as price, Hash(Common), CC#, R S , expiry date. Common contains the completed order form and Hash(HIT S ). The merchant validates the service request and sends a 'Clear' message back to the subscriber with the digital certificates of PG's (PG CERT ) and MCP's (MCP CERT ). The host's software encrypts the subscriber's payment details using the PG's public key, attaches Hash(HIT S ) encrypted with Sig MCP with the completed service form to it. Then using a hash algorithm such as MD5 or SHA-1, the host's software will generate a Message Digest and send the message back to the merchant.
The merchant will verify the message integrity, and the merchant will decrypt the message (containing the Sig MCP ) using its private key, get Hash(HIT S ) details of the subscriber and retrieve the subscriber's completed service form. The merchant then issues a payment Authorization-Request to the PG by forwarding the PG's encrypted payment details of the subscriber along with merchant's certificate, MCP CERT . The PG performs the message integrity check against the MCP CERT that it has received. Once the merchant is authenticated, the PG will forward the AuthorizationRequest to the Issuer via its interface to the secure banking network. The Issuer will respond with a 'Yes/No' message back to the PG. The PG will follow up by generating the Authorization-Response Code and encrypt it using its certificate, followed by sending the Authorization-Response Code to the merchant.
2) Service delegation processes: In SETMS, the Authorization-Response, which is sent to the merchant, will not be forwarded to the subscriber as it will significantly degrade the scalability for multicast services. The services would scale to unlimited subscribers only if there is a mechanism that allows a subscriber to automatically gain access to the multicast traffic once the verification and validation of payment details is complete, without exchange of ACK from the merchant. Therefore, there should be a decentralization of merchant's responsibilities to allow its subscribers to gain access to its services. The service delegation process is depicted in Figure 3 and it is explained as follows. Once the Authorization-Response of the PG is received by the MCP, it is securely forwarded from the MCP to PS and AAA server via TCP/IP. The MCP and PS mutually authenticate by exchanging their Digital Certificates, namely MCP CERT and PS CERT respectively. through digital signatures Similarly, the PS and AAA server authenticate each other by exchanging their digital certificates, namely PS CERT and AAA CERT respectively. The MCP has the sole rights to decide whether to authorize the subscriber to have access to its multicast group identified with a Group Identity (GID). The MCP will forward the GID with its Authorization-Response, "Yes/No" and Hash(HIT S ) encrypted using public key of PS. This process allows total security of the merchant's authorization response to its subscriber. If the authorization-response attribute is "No", the PS simply ignores the message, otherwise the PS will encrypt the Hash(HIT S ) with public key of AAA server and forward it with the GID to the AAA server. The AAA server can decrypt this message to identify the value of the Hash(HIT S ) and cross-check within its Database to identify if there is any subscriber who has registered at its server with the Hash(HIT S ) value that it received from the PS. Certification Authority multicast service parameters to the subscriber followed by session keys generation for each transaction. Once the payment authorization process is complete, the AAA server has the HIT S of the subscriber of the multicast group. The AAA server carries out accounting once the session parameters are exchanged by relying on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange procedure to generate session keys. The AAA server takes responsibility for delegating the service parameters to the authorized subscribers. The AAA server timestamps each and every session and its activity so that it can non-repudiate the subscriber for the multicast service it receives. The AAA server generates the necessary service parameters and sends them to the NAS to permit the subscriber's access to the multicast service identified by the GID. The AAA protocols must have mechanisms to account for the subscriber's active sessions by monitoring total session time, idle time, and total bytes transmitted and received. A message will be sent to the PS indicating the Hash(HIT S ) to which the access has been granted. Future service authorization is done through the validation of the subscriber's HIT S , which is stored in the AAA server's database. In the SETMS, the PS has specific control messages that are dedicated to the AAA server to deliver negative authorization code of specific Hash(HIT S ) of a subscriber. This process allows the AAA server to remove the invalid subscriber's host identity details from its database. This procedure also helps to keep track of hosts who are misbehaving frequently so that measures could be taken by administering personnel to disable his future request for access to multicast service. Apart from this, the AAA server issues self-certified certificates to all the legitimate hosts when the payment authorization procedure is complete. In the future, when additional authentication is needed, the AAA server can just request the digital certificate it issued to its subscriber. The NAS will send a Re-Authenticate message (in the form of a Challenge) to the subscriber in order to validate that a host's session is still active. The subscriber sends its Challenge-Response (containing the identity of its host) to the NAS. Once the NAS receives this response, it then sends an UPDATE message to the AAA server to notify it of the current status of the host.
Validation of the SETMS protocol suite
We have done a formal validation of the proposed SETMS protocol suite using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool [21] , which takes the High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [22] protocol specs as an input and translates it into a corresponding Intermediate Format (IF) specification [23] . This is followed with a thorough analysis of the IF specifications by invoking state-of-the-art backends, which are currently On-the-Fly Model Checker (OFMC) [17, 24] , Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) [16, 24] , SAT-based Model Checker (SATMC) [25] , and Tree Automata-based Protocol Analyser (TA4SP) [26] . These back-ends return attacks (if any) to the protocol analyzer in an intuitive and readable output format.
SETMS specs for the AVISPA tool
The SETMS protocol suite is designed to allow for a secure e-commerce sessions for multicast services. It is a variant of the 2KP protocol. The purpose of SETMS protocol suite specification is intended to provide secrecy of end-host, authentication of the subscriber, and authorization and secrecy of subscriber's e-payments. The SETMS protocol suite run that was illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3 can be depicted in Alice&Bob-style notation as follows:
In the above notation, the agents in the protocol run are S, M, G, and B, which refer to subscriber, merchant, payment gateway and black-box respectively. Black box is a secured module combining together the AAA server and the policy server functionality. Y/N is Boolean variables whose values can be true or false. We would now simplify the above SETMS protocol to remove the actual complexities in the protocol run. This simplification has been done to focus on just validating those SETMS protocol's parameters that contribute towards the objectives of the validation process.
The protocol proceeds among the agents S, M, G and B. S generates nonces Ns, and M generates nonces Nm and Nm1. M and G are assumed to possess asymmetric key pairs (Km, inv_Km) and (Kg, inv_Kg) respectively. S is assumed to possesses digital certificates of the merchant and the PG as {X, Kx}_inv(Km) and {X, Kx}_inv(Kg) respectively. The protocol also makes use of hash function to preserve the freshness of the data in transit. We consider the following goals: the parties shall authenticate each other on (the hash of) the order and payment information. The simplified SETMS protocol specs in Alice&Bob-style notation is as follows:
Step 0. Initial request
S -> M: H(Ns)
Step 1 
SETMS validation results using AVISPA
The problems that were intended to be addressed by the SETMS protocol are as follows:
• Secrecy of HIT S of the subscriber;
• Secrecy of payment details (denoted by "Pay");
• Secrecy of multicast group id (denoted by "Gid");
• Strong authentication on Nm.
The following assumptions were made in validating the SETMS protocol suite: 1) The exchange of digital certificates and signatures procedure between merchant, payment gateway and implicitly trusted CA is assumed to have happened before the protocol run, and 2) The merchant is assumed to be honest when the subscriber sends its HIT S .
The validation results of the HLPSL of the SETMS protocol suite using AVISPA is as follows:
• OFMC: SAFE The SETMS protocol suite has been found to be OFMC safe. It shows that the protocol run executes a bounded number of sessions with the number of visited nodes being 4135 and the search time being 18.68s with a depth search of 14 piles.
• CL-AtSe: SAFE The SETMS protocol suite has been found to be CLAtSe safe. It shows that the protocol run executes a bounded number of sessions with the number of analysed states being 544 and the reachable states being 257. The translation time for the operation has been noted as 5 seconds and computation time as 88 seconds respectively.
• SATMC: INCONCLUSIVE The SATMC results for the SETMS protocol suite were inconclusive as the search time was taking infinite time without showing any results. This implies that the SETMS protocol suite does not fit into the SATMC back-end analyzer and therefore, it cannot return attacks (if any) to the protocol analyzer in a readable output format. This kind of inconclusiveness in quite acceptable when performing validation of a protocol suite. For example, SRP (Secure Remote Passwords) protocol [21] that was validated using the AVISPA tool by invoking back-ends have returned that the SRP is OFMC: Safe, CL-AtSe: Safe, SATMC: Inconclusive and TA4SP: Inconclusive.
• TA4SP: INCONCLUSIVE The TA4SP results for the SETMS protocol suite were inconclusive as the search time was taking infinite time without showing any results. This implies that the SETMS protocol suite does not fit into the TA4SP back-end analyzer and therefore, it cannot show if the protocol is flawed or is safe for any number of sessions.
Conclusion
This research work is the first attempt by any individual to explore the impact of e-commerce infrastructure for multicast services. The SETMS framework provides solutions to the problems of endhost authentication, subscriber and his e-payment authorization, and suggests a distributed accounting model for administering e-commerce sessions. The SETMS framework delivers these solutions by relying on a variant of the 2KP protocol suite and secure service delegating processes namely, MCP and PS, and TTP components that provide support for nonrepudiation of principal parties. SETMS supports nonrepudiation of principals through its PKI infrastructure and also has the capability to support anonymity of the subscriber through the use of unpublished HI. The SETMS is a highly scalable system, easy to administer and easy to use with a moderate computational overhead and message size that results from the usage of a variant of the 2KP for authorizing e-payments.
The SETMS protocol suite secures host identity details and authorizes the subscriber and his epayments. The framework offers scalability of the accounting infrastructure as it uses minimal control and data messages to provide security to e-commerce sessions, thus avoiding traffic congestion. SETMS is robust as there is no integrity check on the multicast UDP datagrams and explicitly there is no need to send a negative acknowledgement to any principal for the lost packets. It is sole decision of the subscriber to decide whether to participate in e-commerce where the merchant offers a service on "best-effort" delivery. The validation of the SETMS protocol suite using the AVISPA tool proves formally that the protocol that was designed is indeed a safe protocol that could be relied on for widespread deployment.
